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THIS IS THE END.. .MY FRIEND:
DISGORGEMENT, DISSOLUTION AND
SEQUESTRATION AS REMEDIES UNDER

STATE UDAP STATUTES
Michael Flynn*

INTRODUCTION
3
hat is up? Food prices 1 , unemployment, crime , housing,
W
4 , finance charges', health insurance premiums'
vforeclosures
the price of many other goods and services.
tickets7 and
airplane

* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law
Center. Former Assistant Attorney General, Washington State Attorney
General's Office, Section Chief, Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division.
The author wishes to thank Gina Lakatos and Jeremy Tyler for their help with
this article.
' See Robert Gavin, Surging Costs of Groceries Hit Home - Bread, Eggs,
Milk Prices Up Sharply, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 2008, at Ai.
2 See Bureau of Lab. Stat., THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: OCTOBER
2oo8, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf (last visited

Nov.

15, 2008).

3 See, e.g., Fla. Dep't of Law Enforcement, 2007 ANNUAL CRIME IN
FLORIDA REPORT, Apr. 2oo8, available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fsac/ucr/
(last visited Aug. 3, 2oo8).
' See Sue Kirchhoff & Adam Shell, Officials Work Fast to Shore Up
System; Fed, Congress Both Get Things Done in a Hurry, USA TODAY, July
15, 2oo8, at iB.
' See Credit Card Industry Practices: Hearing on H.R. 5244 Before the
Subcomm. on FinancialInstitutions and Consumer Credit of the H. Financial
Services Comm., iiotl Cong. (2oo8) (statement of Adam J. Levitin, Associate
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
6 See The Economy: The Problem: Workingman's Blues, ECONOMIST, July
26, 2oo8.
' See Dan Reed, Holiday Travel Will Get Costlier; Fewer Flights, Seats
Mean Soaring Fares, USA TODAY, July 18, 2oo8, at iA.
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What is down? Consumer confidence', securities markets9 , the
value of a dollar'1 , housing construction" and many other leading
economic indicators12 . In what has been described by some as
desperate economic times for many citizens 3 , there is almost
always one thing you can count on to spike upward - the number
of con artists! Those who work to protect the public from con
artists report a hike in consumer complaints and consumer
scams. 4 Beginning in the late i960's, an energized consumer
protection movement has muscled up to ferret out consumer ripoffs.'" Yet, if real progress had been made, why is the next big
consumer scam still so tempting an option?
Many courts have recognized that the appetite of some to
fleece consumers may just be insatiable. 6
Further, the
inventiveness of the "next" generation of con artists both recycles
tried and true scams"' and invents new ones18 . For example,
vulnerable consumers still believe that a leaky roof can be
repaired simply by using a "new sealer."' 9 Moreover, techie
wizards can now easily steal your identity0 , even if you work
Irwin M. Stelzer, A Nation of Worriers;American Economic Discontent
is Well-founded, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, July 15, 2008.
I Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, New Trouble in Auction-Rate
Securities, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2008, at C6.
" Ben Steverman, The Dollar:A Bottom at Last?, BUSINESSWEEK, May 5,
8

2008.

,"Martin Crutsinger, Construction Down; Jobless Claims Up,

THE

DENVER POST, July 17, 2008.

,2Workingman's Blues; The Economy: The Problem, supra Note 7.
Gary Harki, Fourth Branch of Bank Robbed, THE CHARLESTON
GAZETTE,Apr. i6, 2008.
,4Federal Trade Commission, CONSUMER FRAUD AND IDENTITY THEFT
COMPLAINT DATA, JANUARY - DECEMBER 2007, Feb. 2008.
1sDAVID BOLLIER, CITIZEN ACTION AND OTHER BIG IDEAS: A HISTORY
OF RALPH NADER AND THE MODERN CONSUMER MOVEMENT i (Center for

Study of Responsive Law ed., igi).
16 See F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,

405 U.S. 233, 240 (,972).
M. Rose, Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531,
546-49 (I995) (classic "pigeon drop" scam recycled as the new "Spanish Lotto"
scam).
1" Eric L. Carlson, Phishingfor Elderly Victims, 14 ELDER L.J. 423, 433
(2006) (describing new "Phishing" scams targeted at the elderly).
1"Bill Riales, Inside the Roofing Scam, WKRG News 5, May 20, 2008,
http://www.wkrg.com/investigates/article/inside the-roofing-scam/I3893/.
20 Fed. Trade Comm'n, TALKING ABOUT IDENTITY THEFT: A How-To
GUIDE, at 4, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/
downloads/TalkingAboutIDTheft.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2oo8).
17 Carol
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hard to protect against this threat.21 Where did enforcement go
wrong?
This article does not attempt to answer this question
comprehensively.
Instead, this article examines public as
opposed to private enforcement of the consumer protection laws
at the state level through the use of state unfair and deceptive
trade practice statutes ("UDAP"). In particular, this article
overviews the basic enforcement provisions contained in most
state UDAP statutes.
Then this article will focus on one
particular enforcement option recommended by the Federal
Trade Commission and provided for in some state UDAP statutes
but rarely used. This option might be simply stated as putting an
offending business and the principals of such a business, out of
business. This article will conclude that the failure on the part of
public enforcers to aggressively seek to terminate the ability of
violators of UDAP statutes to conduct business may contribute to
the continued flooding of the market place with unlawful trade
practices.

ii. PUBLIC

ENFORCEMENT OF STATE

UDAP STATUTES

Almost every state has some sort of UDAP statute, often
referred to as a "little FTC act" which prohibits unfair and
deceptive trade practices in trade or commerce.2 2
This
prohibition applies not only to individuals who conduct business
but also to business entities like corporations and partnerships.23
UDAP statutes typically provide for a private right of action by
individuals, even corporations, and for public enforcement mostly
through the state Attorneys General.2 4 The specific enforcement
tools usually available for public enforcers include but are not
limited to pre-suit investigation subpoena power2 5 and may
include administrative cease and desist orders 26 . Key remedies
available in UDAP statutes for public enforcement agencies
include not only a request for declaratory relief2 7 but also a court
21 Id. at 7.
22 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND

PRACTICES i (Jonathan Sheldon & Carolyn Carter eds., 6th ed.
23 Id. at 581.
24 Id.
25

at i.

Id. at 931.

26

Id. at 945.
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207 (West 2008).

27 See,

2004).
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issued injunction prohibiting specific unfair and deceptive trade
practices 2 , the payment of consumer restitution29 , the assessment
of a civil penalty against the offending business and its
principals 0 and the awarding of attorney fees and costs payable
by the offending business and its principals if the public enforcer
is successful in prosecuting a UDAP claim31 .
What is clear from this summary list of public
enforcement tools and remedies available under UDAP statutes is
that state legislatures recognize the need to police the
marketplace and are willing to empower public enforcers with a
special set of legal devices and cures to protect consumers and
legitimate business.
One of the many remedies available to public enforcers
under some versions of the UDAP statute is the ability to put a
business out of business.33 These UDAP statutes provide that as
a remedy for a finding that a business or an individual committed
an unfair or deceptive trade practice, that the public enforcement
agency may request and a court may order:
Dissolution of a corporation;
Sequestration of all of the assets of a business or
individual; and
Appointment of a receiver or special magistrate to wind
up the business activity culminating in the payment of
consumer restitution and the payment of civil penalties
and attorney fees to the public enforcer.34
Without question a court issued injunction combined with
dissolution of a business entity, sequestration of assets and the
payment of money to injured consumers and public enforcers in
28

NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note

22,

at 948.

Id. at 958.
30 Id. at 954.
31 Id. at 964; see State v. Alpine Air Products, Inc., 49o N.W.2d 888 (Minn.
29

Ct. App. 1992) (more than $ioo,ooo awarded the state in fees), affd on other
grounds, 5oo N.W.2d 788 (Minn. I993).
32 See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 22, at 931-66.
13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207 (West 2oo8) (dissolution or
reorganization of any enterprise).
-14 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 22,,at 963.

2
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the form of civil penalties and reimbursement of attorney
fees and
5
deterrent.
strong
a
and
remedy
cost is both a strong

III.

THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT

Although court issued injunctions prohibiting specific
kinds of unfair and deceptive trade practices are a routine part of
most court judgments36 and consent decrees obtained for
violation of UDAP statutes3 7, almost none of these injunctions
prohibit the business entity or its individual principles from
conducting business again. In fact, there is no reported case in
which the public enforcers have sought and received the
dissolution of business entities and the sequestration of assets for
distribution to injured consumers and public enforcers as a
remedy for a UDAP violation. The powerful remedies of
dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration, as recommended
and employed by the FTC, remain largely unused and inactive.
In 1966, the Federal Trade Commission proposed that
state UDAP statutes should at least authorize the state courts "for
violation of an injunction issued under the Act to restrain unfair
or deceptive practices, . . . to assess civil penalties in an amount
up to $25,ooo;38 and the court additionally is authorized, in its

discretion, to order dissolution or suspension or forfeiture of
franchise of any corporation which violates such an injunction."3 9
The Federal Trade Commission went on to comment that the
remedy of an injunction and a civil fine or penalty is a
prohibitory remedy, while the remedy of dissolution,
disgorgement and sequestration is a structural remedy.4" Public
enforcement agencies have traditionally focused on the
prohibitory remedies because such remedies can effectively stop
unfair and deceptive trade practices.
However, public
11 Id. at 737-38; Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 666 (Mass. 1991)
(deterrent value of multiple damage awards).
36 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 22, at 945.
31Id. at 95 1-52.

38 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Proposes That States Enact

Laws to Prevent Consumer Deception and Unfair Competitive Practices, Also
to Regulate Hearing Aid Dealers and Correspondence Schools (July 7, 1966)
[hereinafter FTC Proposal] (on file with author).
31Id. at io.

40 Roundtable on Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases,
available at http://www.ftc.govlbc/international/docs/AbuseRemediesUnited
States.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
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enforcement agencies are reluctant to invoke a structural remedy
because they believe that structural remedies like dissolution,
disgorgement and sequestration should only be used when the
prohibitory remedies of an injunction and civil fine would be
inappropriate.4 1 Richard Gold, an attorney for the Federal Trade
Commission, takes the position that the structural remedies of
dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration contained in the
Federal Trade Commission Act should be included in state
UDAP statutes as a safety net to ensure that corporations abide
by any prohibitory actions issued by the court, such as an
injunction or fine.
Even though recommended, only fifteen states have
incorporated structural remedies like dissolution, disgorgement
and sequestration into their UDAP statutes. The fifteen states
are: Alabama 43 , Connecticut 44, Florida 45 , Idaho 46 , Iowa 47 ,
Id.
Telephone Interview with Richard Gold, Attorney at Law, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, in Washington D.C., Md. (August i6, 2007).
43 ALA. CODE § 8-ID-II(C) (2008) ("Furthermore, upon a second or
continuing violation of an injunction after imposition of the sanctions in
subsection (a) of this section, and upon petition by the Attorney General or a
district attorney, the circuit court of general jurisdiction of a county may, in its
discretion, order the dissolution or suspension or forfeiture of the franchise of
any corporation, partnership, or sole proprietorship which willfully violates the
terms of any injunction issued under Section 8-I9-8).
44 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-I Iop (West 2007) ("Upon petition
by the
Attorney General, the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford may,
in its discretion, order the dissolution or suspension or forfeiture of the
franchise of any corporation which violates the terms of any injunction issues
under section 42-iIom.").
45 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207 (West 208) ("Upon motion of the enforcing
authority or any interested party in any action brought under subsection (i),
the court may make appropriate orders, including, but not limited to,... order
41
42

the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise ....
").

CODE ANN. § 48-616 (2008) ("Upon petition by the attorney
general, the district court of the county in which the principal place of business
of the corporation is located may, in its discretion, order the dissolution or
suspension or forfeiture of franchise of any corporation which violates the
terms of any injunction issued under section 48-6o6, Idaho Code.").
47 IOWA CODE ANN. § 714.16(6) (West 2003) ("If a person fails
or refuses to
file a statement or report, or obey any subpoena issued by the attorney general,
the attorney general may, after notice, apply to the Polk county district court
or the district court for the county in which the person resides or is located
and, after hearing, request an order: ... dissolving a corporation created by or
46

IDAHO

under the laws of the state . .

").
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Massachusetts48 , Montana49 , Nebraska ° , New
Oregon52 ,

Vermont,56
48

Pennsylvania53 ,

and

Rhode

Washington"7

Island 54,
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Hampshire",

South

Carolina 5,

. Thirteen of these states model the

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9 3 A, § 8 (West 2006) ("Upon petition by the

attorney general, the court may for habitual violation of injunctions issued
pursuant to section four order the dissolution, or suspension or forfeiture of
franchise of any corporation or the right of any individual or foreign
corporation to do business in the commonwealth.").
41 MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-141 (2007) ("Upon the petition by the
department, the district court, may, in its discretion, order the dissolution,
suspension, or forfeiture of franchise of any corporation which violates the
terms of any injunction issued under 30-14-11i.").
10 NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 59-1615 (LexisNexis 2oo8) ("Upon the petition

by the Attorney General, the court may, in its discretion, order the dissolution,
or suspension or forfeiture, of any corporation which violates ...

the terms of

any injunction issued as provided the in the Consumer Protection Act.").
s1 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3 58-A: 9 (2oo8) ("Upon petition by the attorney
general, the court may order, for habitual violation of injunctions issued
pursuant to RSA 358-A:4, the dissolution, suspension, or forfeiture of franchise
of any corporation, or the right of any foreign corporation to do business in the
state.").
52 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646.646 (West 2003) ("Upon petition by the
prosecuting attorney, the court may, in its discretion, order the dissolution or
suspension or forfeiture of the license or franchise of any person who violates
the terms of any injunction issued under ORS 646.632.").
" 73 PA. STAT. ANN. § 201-9 (West 2008) ("Upon petition by the Attorney

General, the court having jurisdiction, may, in its discretion, order the
dissolution, suspension or forfeiture of the franchise or right to business of any
person, firm or corporation which violates the terms of an injunction under
section 4 of this act.").
14 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-9 (2oo8) ("Upon petition by the attorney
general, the superior court may, in its discretion, order the dissolution, or
suspension or forfeiture of franchise of any corporation that violates the terms
of an injunction issued under § 6-13.1-5.").
"' S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-120 (2007) ("Upon petition by the Attorney

General, the court of common pleas may, for good cause shown, order the
dissolution or suspension or forfeiture of any franchise or charter of any
corporation which violates the terms of any injunction issued under § 39-5-

50."1).

("Whenever the attorney general or
a state's attorney has reason to believe that any person is using or is about to
use any method, act or practice declared by section 2453 of this title to be
unlawful, or has reason to believe that any person has violated any assurance
of discontinuance entered into pursuant to section 2459 of this title, and that
proceedings would be in the public interest, the attorney general, or a state's
attorney if authorized to proceed by the attorney general, may bring an action
in the name of the state against such person to restrain by temporary or
permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice or to dissolve a
56 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2458 (2007)

188
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Federal Trade Commission Act permitting dissolution,
disgorgement and sequestration when a UDAP violator
habitually violates multiple injunctions."8 It is remarkable, if not
a comment on the ineffectiveness of this structural remedy, that
there is no Federal Trade Commission or state UDAP reported
cases that specifically apply all of these structural remedies. 9
Perhaps the non-use of the structural remedies means that repeat
UDAP violators do not exist. This is hardly the case.60 Rather
than abandoning unfair and deceptive trade practices, many
clever UDAP violators restructure business entities and resurface
with a revised but similar unfair and deceptive trade practice
scheme.6
Perhaps public enforcement agencies have been lax in
monitoring UDAP violator's compliance with injunctive orders. 62
This would not be surprising given the lack of funding.63 It is
domestic corporation or revoke the certificate of authority granted a foreign
corporation. The action may be brought in the superior court of the county in
which such person resides, has a place of business or is doing business. Said
courts are authorized to issue temporary or permanent injunctions to restrain
and prevent violations of this chapter, such injunctions to be issued without
bonds, and so to dissolve, or revoke the certificate of authority of, a
corporation.").
" WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 19.86.150 (LexisNexis 2008) ("Upon petition
by the attorney general, the court may, in its discretion, order the dissolution,
or suspension or forfeiture of franchise, of any corporation which shall violate
RCW i9.86.030 or i9.86.040 or the terms of any injunction issued as in this
chapter provided.").
58 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 22, at 967-89 (The states that
have modeled their statutes after the FTC Act to require a violation of
multiple injunctions before a dissolution remedy is available includes:
Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Washington).
'9 Id. at 947; see, e.g., Diane C. Lade, Springs Attorney Faces Suspension,
SUN-SENTINEL, July 23, 2008, at 3 D.
60

NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,

supra note

22,

at 952-53; State ex rel.

Abrams v. East Coast Auto Consultants Corp., 472 N.Y.S.2d ioio (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1984) (changing company name and phone number in attempt to avoid
compliance with injunction).
61

Id.

See Id.
See
Fed.
Trade
Comm'n,
FTC
Appropriation History,
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oed/fmo/appropriationhistory.shtm; see also Fed Trade
Comm'n, FTC Full-Time Equivalent History, http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/oedlfmol
fte2.shtm [hereinafter FTC History].
61

63
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also possible that the trigger for invoking the structural remedies
of dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration, that is, multiple
violations of prior injunctions, renders the remedy useless.
Finally perhaps, the threat of these kinds of structural remedies is
used by public enforcement agencies to leverage consent decrees
and other settlement concessions from UDAP violators.64 Yet
even from the two states, Florida and Vermont, which place no
prerequisites on public enforcement agencies from seeking
structural remedies against UDAP violators,65 there are no
reported cases where dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration
have been requested and court ordered.
In short, the structural remedies for use against UDAP
violators have never found a footing in consumer protection law.
The question becomes when, if ever, should the remedies of
dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration be applied?
IV. THE CASE FOR USE OF STRUCTURAL REMEDIES FOR
VIOLATIONS OF STATE UDAP STATUTES

First, it must be noted that not all state UDAP statutes
authorize dissolution, disgorgement and sequestration as
remedies for UDAP violations.66 Until these states amend their
UDAP statutes, the option of these remedies will remain closed.
Other state UDAP statutes provide for dissolution, disgorgement
and sequestration only upon a showing of multiple violations of
court issued injunctions against unfair and deceptive trade
practices.
Certainly, this kind of repeat violator meets the
64 Based

on my own experience as an Assistant Attorney General in the
Washington State Attorney General's Office in the Antitrust and Consumer
Protection Division and working with Federal Trade Commission and other
state Attorneys General's offices, many settlements of UDAP cases occurred
because of the prospect of having to pay civil penalties, attorney fees and costs.
Defendants routinely signed off on consent decrees containing strong
injunctive provisions in return for a reduced payment of attorney fees and cost
and suspension of the payment of civil penalties if the defendant complied
with the injunctive provisions. These consent decrees did not routinely
contain any provision concerning or prompting dissolution, disgorgement or
sequestration as an initial remedy or as a remedy for a violation of the consent
decree.
65 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.207 (West 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2458
(2007).
66 See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
67 See supra note 58.

supra note 23, at 967-89.

Igo
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criteria for application of these kinds of structural remedies.
What would make a good case for using structural
remedies for violations of state UDAP statutes in states that
provide for them?
Let's examine a realistic hypothetical.6" Suppose a state
public enforcement agency charged with enforcing a UDAP
statute knows of a nationwide pest control company that operates
in that state and specializes in removing and protecting buildings
from termite infestation. One of the basic techniques used to
prevent and remove termites is to drill holes in the concrete
foundation of a building and then inject poison to kill off and
prevent termites from nesting. To be effective, these holes must
be drilled through the foundation every few inches. This pest
control company has made millions of dollars over the years and
its employees, stock holders and corporate officers have all been
paid handsomely for the success of this company. Upon further
investigation, it turns out that the company sanctioned its
employees to just drill through on every other foundation hole.
Therefore, customers, even if they checked, would see the drill
holes properly spaced but not know that only every other hole
was actually drilled through so poison could be injected.
Needless to say, many buildings remained infested with termites.
Let's consider a second hypothetical case.69 Suppose a
public enforcement agency is aware of a gas company that claims
one of its gasoline products contains a special additive that will
provide for a cleaner burning engine, lessen air pollution, and
This example is based in part on a past investigation conducted by the
Florida Attorney General's. Office concerning a national pest control company.
The investigation blossomed into a multi-state investigation in which the pest
control company signed off on either a consent decree or an assurance of
voluntary compliance which enjoined the company from committing the
referenced unfair and deceptive trade practices.
69 This example is based on some evidence received by state Attorneys
General in the early I98O's as part of the multi-district antitrust litigation
against the major oil companies for price fixing. Although not specifically part
of the complaint or the eventual resolution of this litigation, some investigative
reports and other testimony revealed that the oil companies may have been
engaged in the referenced unfair and deceptive trade practice. Even today if a
consumer takes the time to watch oil company trucks fill up gas tanks at
service stations, you will notice that the different grades of gasoline may have
a different color. The purpose of this example is again to sflggest that this kind
of unfair and deceptive trade practice scheme may be appropriate for initial
structural remedies.
6
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increase gas mileage at a cost of a few cents per gallon. Upon
further investigation, it turns out that the only difference between
this gas company's fuel grades is color. Consumers who purchase
this gas based on these representations do not realize an increase
in gas mileage, air pollution is not decreased, and the engine
wears out just as quickly as it does with any other grade of gas is
used.
Each of these cases is an example of an unfair trade
practice, because consumers paid either for work that was not
performed or a product that did not perform.7" The cases, as well,
are examples of deceptive trade practices, because consumers
were induced to pay for work or for a product believing the
promise that the company would perform a complete job or that
the product would provide enhanced performance" .
Is it not true that these kinds of UDAP cases justify the
nationwide pest control company, the gas company and the
individual policy makers for both companies forfeit the privilege
to conduct business? In fact, such business behavior merits the
dissolution of the business entities and the sequestration of the
businesses' assets, including the individual policy makers' assets,
to insure full payment of consumer restitution, civil penalties and
the public enforcer's attorney fees and costs. Such a remedy
protects consumers and provides a visible deterrent to others
from launching unfair and deceptive trade practice schemes."
Moreover, removing barriers to initially employing this kind of
remedy, such as multiple violations of previously issued
injunctions, enhances swift and effective public enforcement of
state UDAP prohibitions. The failure of state legislatures and for
that matter, the Federal Trade Commission, to incorporate the
structural remedies
of dissolution, disgorgement
and
sequestration as remedies of first resort in these kinds of cases
seems short-sighted.
The reluctance of public enforcement
agencies to invoke structural remedies as provided by state
UDAP statutes is ill-conceived.
One's view of the proposition put forth in this article may
very well depend on whether he or she looks at the ability to
engage in business as a "right" or a privilege. If one views the
70

NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 23, at 204; Pattersonv. Beall,

19 P.3 d 839, 846 (Okla.

2000).

NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 23, at 144-45.
72 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 23.
71
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opportunity to conduct business and make money as a privilege
that is not guaranteed but conditionally granted as long as the
business treats people fairly and honestly, then aggressively
revoking this privilege of doing business and disgorging profits
from a business and individuals who commit unfair or deceptive
trade practices is not only an appropriate remedy but also a
necessary one. No business should get a free pass on unfair or
deceptive trade practice.73 If, however, one views the capacity to
operate a successful business as a right that cannot be forfeited
but only policed and managed, then revoking the right to do
business cannot be sanctioned and only in the most radical of
circumstances can businesses be dissolved and profits be
disgorged for committing unfair or deceptive trade practices. The
later view has no basis in constitutional law74 or in the legislative
intent or purpose of UDAP statutes". The former confirms what
UDAP statutes are designed to do.76
V.

CONCLUSION

Public enforcement of state UDAP statutes has long been
viewed as the front lines of consumer protection. Reluctance or
hesitancy on the part of public enforcers to use the full range of
remedies available against violators of state UDAP statutes
shortchanges the consumer. Is there risk in aggressively seeking
remedies that include an injunction against a company and
individuals from conducting business and dissolving business
entities and sequestering assets of violator business? Of course,
there is - the public enforcement agency might not get the
requested relief, even though courts are not inclined to overrule
proposed remedies for unfair and deceptive trade practices if the
remedy is related to the violation."
Could there be political
fallout orchestrated by the business community? I dare say there
would be - but not from the legitimate businesses that have also
73 Id.

74See

U.S. CONST. (the Constitution does not dictate that one has a

fundamental right to operate a business).
's See NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note
76 FTC Proposal, supra note 39.

23,

at i.

" See 2008 FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE FTC IN 2008: A FORCE FOR
CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION (Mar. 2oo8), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
OS/2008/3/ChairmansReport2oo8.pdf (last visited Aug. ii, 2008).
78 NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 23, at 948-49.
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been injured by the UDAP violations. Would there be criticism
that the public enforcer abused its discretion in seeking such a
"harsh" remedy from a business entity and individuals? Yes, but
not from the consumers who were treated unfairly and
deceptively.
It will take courage and funding for public enforcers to set
out on a path that vigorously seeks the full range of remedies
available under state UDAP statutes. In hard economic times, to
not seek those remedies just adds more hardship to those least
capable of protecting themselves from business predators. At
some point some government enforcer will perhaps have the
nerve to say to UDAP violators, in the words of Jim Morrison,
"This is the end... my friend."79

19 THE DOORS, The End, on THE DOORS (Elektra Records 1967).

